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ABSTRACT
Americans have long been bound by a shared sense of constitutional commonality, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned the notion that federal constitutional rights should be
allowed to depend on distinct state and local legal norms. In reality,
however, federal rights do indeed vary, and they do so as a result of
their contingent relationship to the diversity of state and local laws
on which they rely. Focusing on criminal procedure rights in particular, this Article examines the benefits and detriments of constitutional contingency, and casts in new light many enduring understandings of American constitutionalism, including the effects of
incorporation doctrine and the nation’s mythic sense of shared
constitutional commitment.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite their many differences, Americans have long been bound
by a shared sense of constitutional commonality. As John Jay
observed in The Federalist Papers, “we have uniformly been one
people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges, protection.”1 The sense was first given
structural effect with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause2 and
later with the Fourteenth Amendment, which served as a fulcrum
to extend the U.S. Bill of Rights to the nation as a whole.3 As a
consequence, federal constitutional rights today serve as a “floor” for
the nation’s political subunits, which, although permitted to provide
their residents more in the way of rights,4 can provide nothing less.5
Over the years this sensibility has been fortified by frequent
denunciations of the perceived perils of constitutional disuniformity,
especially as a result of nonfederal influence. Echoing Madison’s
view that the “mutability” of state laws represented a “serious evil,”6
the Supreme Court in particular has lamented the specter of
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38-39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Lani
Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 6, 7 (2008) (quoting
2008 speech of Justice Anthony Kennedy to the effect that “[t]he Constitution is the enduring
and common link that we have as Americans”).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby”).
3. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.1-2.6 (3d ed. 2007).
4. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (noting that the
nation’s federalist structure does not “limit the authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution”).
5. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting
that states lack the “power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921) (“The
Constitution was intended—its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the
fundamental rights of the individual.”).
6. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 644, 646 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). At the Convention,
Madison warned against states’ “constant tendency” to “encroach on the federal authority”
and urged that the federal government “must countroul the centrifugal tendency of the States;
which ... will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the
political system.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164-65 (Max
Farand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
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citizens being subject to “arbitrarily variable protection.”7 Permitting federal rights to depend on state laws would allow protections
to “turn upon ... trivialities,”8 resulting in rights “‘vary[ing] from
place to place and from time to time.’”9 The upshot, as Justice Scalia
recently asserted, would be to “change the uniform ‘law of the land’
into a crazy quilt.”10
In reality, however, a crazy quilt does indeed exist. Although
federal constitutional law nominally serves as the nation’s connecting sinew, its application, as this Article makes clear, hinges on
state and local legal norms, which are highly variable and create
a functionally irregular rights regime. For example, police authority to search and seize individuals, regulated by the Fourth
Amendment, hinges on state and local decisions to criminalize
particular behaviors, which themselves can be variously defined.
Consequently, one’s Fourth Amendment freedom from search and
seizure in California differs from that enjoyed in Florida, Texas,
Maine, and the Dakotas. It also differs within states themselves, as
a result of the significant criminal lawmaking authority of local
governments.
The state of affairs stems from two central features of the nation’s
governing structure. The first is federalism, the decentralizing effect
of which preserves the authority of national political subunits to
enact and enforce laws, especially relative to police power.11 As the
Court stated last Term in Danforth v. Minnesota, “[n]onuniformity
is ... an unavoidable reality in a federalist system.”12 There exists a
“fundamental interest” in preserving this subnational authority, the
7. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004).
8. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
9. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 815).
10. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2); see also, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9
(2008) (citation omitted) (asserting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “cannot be
allowed to founder on the vagaries of state criminal law, lest the [counsel] attachment rule
be rendered utterly ‘vague and unpredictable’”).
11. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system,
the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’”) (citation
omitted); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(observing that the powers of state governments “extend to all the objects which ... concern
the lives, liberties and properties of the people”); id. NO. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton)
(regarding states as the primary “guardian[s] of life and property”).
12. 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008).
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7-2 majority insisted, that cannot be constrained by “any general,
undefined federal interest in uniformity.”13
The second catalyst is incorporation doctrine, which despite
seeking the nationalization of the Bill of Rights in lieu of the
historically variable state-based rights regime, has created a
variable rights regime of its own. Federal rights apply to the nation
as a whole, in substance, but their actual application depends on
triggering conditions contained in state and local criminal laws. As
a result of incorporation, such laws have come to serve as a legal
endoskeleton of the federal rights regime, infusing the nation’s
constitutional order with significant variability.
This Article examines how state and local criminal laws affect
federal constitutional criminal procedure rights, a domain where
life and liberty are most seriously imperiled.14 The discussion
begins with a survey of how contingency plays out with respect to
several core criminal procedure protections: the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel, freedom from police questioning, and trial by jury. Although federalism and incorporation
have long defined American governance from a structural perspective, their real world impact on the actual distribution of federal
constitutional rights has gone unaddressed.15 Part I remedies this
13. Id.
14. Subnational influence also evidences itself in other federal rights areas, perhaps most
notably in procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the
availability of due process protections depends on whether a protectable interest exists under
state or local law. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756-57 (2005).
Similarly, whether a contract right exists, protectable by the Contracts Clause of Article I,
often turns on state or local law, see, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100
(1938); so, too, whether a takings claim is available under the Fifth Amendment, see, e.g.,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). With water rights, regional, not
state or local, variation can be determinative of federal protection. See David B. Schorr,
Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 7-8 (2005) (noting that in the western U.S. surface water rights are typically
viewed as private property, unlike in the East).
15. Importantly, contingent constitutionalism is to be distinguished from the phenomenon
of the U.S. adopting by incorporation state statutory norms. The Assimilative Crimes Act
(ACA), for instance, dictates that state criminal laws govern federal criminal prosecutions of
crimes committed on federal enclaves, such as national parks, when federal statutory law
does not address the matter and state law does not conflict with federal policy. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 13 (2006). In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 297 (1957), the Court upheld an
amended version of the ACA, which permitted federal adoption of state criminal laws enacted
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oversight and highlights the critically important distributive
consequences of the subnational normative variation that underlies
the nation’s constitutional order.
Part II examines the phenomenon from an institutional design
perspective. Today, it is recognized that state, local, and federal
governments significantly influence one another. Just as the nation
is no longer understood to operate under a strictly dualist governance regime, with the respective governments hermetically separated from one another in their functions,16 it is well known that
states affect the substantive shape of federal constitutional law.
State preferences, for instance, are regularly considered by the
federal judiciary in determining federal constitutional norms,
ranging from whether there exists a right to engage in specific
conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment,17 to six- versus twelvemember jury composition in noncapital cases under the Sixth
Amendment.18 Federal courts also regularly lend constitutional
credence to state preferences in assessing whether a particular
application of the death penalty satisfies Eighth Amendment
“evolving standards of decency.”19 Finally, federal constitutional
outcomes can depend on discrete community norms, such as those
on an ongoing basis, infusing federal law with the temporality of state laws. The ACA thus
represents a prime example of what Henry Hart called the “interstitial” role of state
substantive law vis-à-vis the federal government. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 498 (1954) (observing that “[t]he
federal law which governs the exercise of state authority is obviously interstitial law,
assuming the existence of, and depending for its impact upon, the underlying bodies of state
law”).
With contingent constitutionalism, federal law also “assum[es] the existence of ” and
“depend[s] for its impact upon, the underlying bodies of state law.” Id. However, rather than
using state and local law to affect federal statutory outcomes, such law is used to condition
the availability of federal constitutional rights. For discussion of the influence that state and
local criminal laws have on federal criminal case outcomes, including sentencing, see Wayne
A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime
Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65 (2006).
16. On this recognition more generally, see, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, Theory of
Federalism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1006 (Leonard W. Levy &
Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000); Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty:
Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 570-71 (2003) (invalidating a Texas
law criminalizing adult consensual sodomy).
18. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86, 98-100 (1970).
19. See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2006).
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of tribal reservations and military bases, and, relative to obscenity,
local standards of decency.20
Such instances, however, differ in important ways from the
phenomenon considered here. Most fundamentally, contingent constitutionalism does not concern the substantive content of federal
constitutional norms, but rather whether the norms themselves are
actually triggered. The phenomenon thus operates organically as a
matter of course, in “Red” and “Blue” and small and large jurisdictions alike,21 directly affecting the scope of constitutional protections
available to the nation’s denizens. Moreover, rather than reflecting
headcounts of aggregated preferences of subnational political units,
contingent constitutionalism reflects—and instantiates—the actual
individualized normative preferences of such units. As a result,
state and local preferences, rather than creating constitutional
norms from the top down, drive the application of federally recognized norms from the bottom up.
This design outcome has both benefits and detriments. Perhaps
the most significant benefit is that state and local governments are
assured a voice in the rights regime that the federal government
superimposes upon them. Their normative preferences, embodied in
their criminal laws, are directly reflected in the federal rights that
their inhabitants are accorded. This symmetry, however, gives rise
to a variety of difficulties. Most critically, tying federal rights to the
majoritarian democratic preferences of jurisdictions in which
individuals are physically located renders such rights captive to
state and local political prerogative. Moreover, the very process of
making federal rights contingent on state and local political borders,
not national citizen status, negatively affects an array of other
important values, including the nation’s shared sense of constitu-

20. See Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129 (1999).
21. On the increasing normative parcelization of the nation more generally, see BILL
BISHOP & ROBERT CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA
IS TEARING US APART (2008); Paul Farhi, Elephants are Red, Donkeys Are Blue; Color Is Sweet,
So Their States We Hue, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at C1. While the nation’s modern-day
heterogeneity has been doubted by some in principle, see, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm
Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 944 (1994),
criminal justice norms have long constituted an area exhibiting significant state, local, and
regional variation. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
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tional commitment and the premise of rights equality associated
with it.
Part III examines the several ways in which recognition of contingent constitutionalism casts in new light current and traditional
understandings of the nation’s constitutional order. Chief among
these is that rights nationalism is a myth, one that ironically itself
has been subverted by the very process of nationalization intended
to temper the variability of subnational influence. Laying this myth
to rest, despite risking loss of a measure of the nation’s collective
identity, has a variety of potential epistemic benefits. Members of
the public and political leaders alike will hopefully gain greater
awareness of the nexus between state and local substantive criminal
laws and federal rights, holding promise for an enhanced (and long
overdue) deliberateness in criminal law-making policy. Recognition
of the contingent quality of federal rights also underscores the
enduring importance of physical space to the application of legal
norms. Despite sustained efforts at nationalization, federal rights
remain highly sensitized to geography; their availability depends
not on physical location on U.S. soil, but rather the substantive
criminal law preferences of state and local governments.
Finally, recognition of contingency offers an important opportunity to reexamine the legacy of incorporation doctrine. For years, the
process of incorporation inspired sharp judicial disagreement, with
a prime concern centering on whether state law norms should figure
in the delineation of federal constitutional rights. Such influence, of
course, came to pass with the preferences of some (but not all) states
being reflected in the rights ultimately identified by the Court and
imposed as a constitutional floor on the nation as a whole. As this
Article makes clear, the constitutional influence of subnational
political units continues today, reflected not in the substantive
content of constitutional rights, as in the formative era of incorporation, but rather in the availability of such rights, on the basis of
their substantive criminal laws. As a result of this influence, the
nation’s ostensibly uniform federal rights regime in reality remains
a crazy quilt of rights, marked by variability akin to that of preincorporation times.
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I. CRIMINAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL VARIABILITY
Historically, a sharp line divided the bundle of constitutional
rights available to individuals ensnared in the state and federal
criminal justice systems. Prior to the advent of selective incorporation in the mid-twentieth century, the rights regimes of the
respective systems were quite distinct.22 Today, with almost all
federal constitutional criminal procedure rights imposed on the
states,23 this stark differentiation is no longer in evidence. As it
turns out, however, the mere fact that state and local governments
must recognize a given federally originated right does not resolve
whether the right will actually be made available. This is because
criminal law preferences in both contexts play a critically important
role in the extension of federal rights.
This Part addresses two key areas of constitutional criminal
procedure in which this contingency has perhaps greatest effect:
Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine and the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantees of counsel and a jury trial. As a result of
the combined influence of federalism and incorporation—as well as
the distinctly formalistic jurisprudential approaches adopted by the
Supreme Court—subnational polities play a dispositive role in the
availability of federal rights.
A. Fourth Amendment
Since 1961, when the Supreme Court made the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule applicable to the states,24 substantive criminal law has figured centrally in the determination of
whether the Amendment’s protections extend to individuals. From
a rule of law perspective, the existence of a substantive legal basis
to justify a search or seizure should plainly serve as a constitutional
22. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 800-05 (2009).
23. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 3, § 2.6 (noting a handful of exceptions).
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). As a technical matter, the Fourth Amendment
was made applicable to the states a dozen years before in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
not until Mapp, however, was the decision fully felt when the exclusionary rule remedy was
extended to the states. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 660.
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sine qua non. Only recently, however, did the Supreme Court clarify
the role of state and local positive law vis-à-vis what constitutes an
“unreasonable” search or seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Until 2001, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,25 it remained an open
question whether police, acting without a warrant but with probable
cause that a minor offense occurred, had constitutional authority to
arrest.26 The five-member Atwater majority held that so long as
probable cause exists that “even a very minor criminal offense” was
committed in an officer’s presence—there, the failure to wear an
automobile seat belt, punished only by a fine (not incarceration)
under state law—an officer is constitutionally free to execute a
custodial arrest.27
Atwater provided police with significant warrantless arrest authority and underscored the critical importance of state and local
law. So long as some lawful basis for an arrest is present, and
probable cause exists that the misconduct occurred, an individual
cannot reasonably be expected to remain free from police seizure.28
The Court’s positivist orientation has echoed in several subsequent
cases, each decided by 9-0 votes. In Devenpeck v. Alford,29 the Court
held that an arrest is constitutionally reasonable so long as it is
anchored in some lawful basis, supported by probable cause, even
if the basis initially identified is later deemed legally unjustified.30
And in 2008, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule need not be applied when an officer
executed a probable cause-based arrest for a minor traffic offense,31
even though, unlike in Atwater, state law did not authorize arrest
under the circumstances.32
25. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant,
75 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 485-92 (1927); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests
and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771 (1993).
27. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
28. Id.
29. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
30. Id. at 152-53.
31. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
32. Indeed, state law expressly prohibited arrest under the circumstances. Thus was laid
to rest the potential for a nonconstitutional statutory limit on arrest authority, previously
identified by the Court as preferable. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352 (“It is of course easier to
devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the Constitution,
simply because the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration
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These three decisions, although important in themselves, assume
even greater significance when viewed in conjunction with an
earlier decision, also decided unanimously, Whren v. United States.33
In Whren, the Court held that probable cause to believe that a traffic safety law was violated justified a police decision to detain a
motorist, regardless of whether the officer had an ulterior—perhaps
unfounded—suspicion of more serious misconduct.34 In addition to
rejecting any Fourth Amendment limit on the discretionary arrest
authority of police,35 the Court restated its enduring reluctance to
second guess the wisdom of substantive criminal laws, emphasizing
that it was loath to undertake any effort to identify and limit
possibly “exorbitant [criminal] codes” relative to Fourth Amendment
strictures.36
As a result, a simple calculus obtains: the more legal authority
police have in a given jurisdiction, the less freedom of bodily
movement and privacy is enjoyed by individuals “to be let alone.”37
So long as police can invoke some lawful authority to arrest, and
without having to subsume it under a broader principle.”). Both before and after Atwater,
several states imposed procedural limits on warrantless arrests, adopting laws requiring
police to issue citations for minor offenses, except under extenuating circumstances, such as
if the suspect would persist in the misconduct. See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court
Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 445-46 (2002). Relegating arrest
limits to the will of the political process, however, has had predictable results, such as in
Texas, where Atwater arose, when the legislature passed and the governor vetoed a bill
seeking to limit police arrest authority. Id. at 448.
33. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
34. Id. at 819. In Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769. 771-72 (2001), the Court affirmed
Whren in the context of a full custodial arrest, holding that the subjective motivation of
officers is irrelevant.
35. Whren, 517 U.S. at 817-18.
36. Id. at 818-19. On this reluctance more generally, see Louis D. Billionis, Process, the
Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1272-99 (1998). See also
Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 783 (1994) (observing that courts “do not substantively
scrutinize the necessity and value of a particular criminal law even though a person’s liberty
from incarceration hangs in the balance”).
37. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 358 (1998) (identifying the Amendment’s core
protection as “the ability of the individual to refuse to accede to the government intrusion”);
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 passim (2008) (arguing that the core
safeguard of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of personal security and physical
liberty).
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they follow the substantive letter of the law,38 their authority to
execute a warrantless arrest attaches.39 And with this power, as
allowed by a long line of Supreme Court decisions, comes the
expansive authority to search the bodies, possessions, and automobiles of arrestees.40
The foregoing calculus, when viewed in the abstract, however,
significantly understates the actual operative force of the substantive criminal law. Unlike areas of civil and commercial law, which
have become increasingly homogenized nationwide over time,41
criminal law has retained its diversity.42 One sees significant
variation in both the kinds of behaviors that warrant criminalization in states43 and the definitions of mutually proscribed
misconduct.44 States also vary significantly in the punishments they
prescribe,45 which can affect officers’ warrantless authority to enter
suspects’ homes46 and effectuate Terry stops based upon reasonable
suspicion.47 The depth and breadth of these differences directly
38. To date, at least, police typically are not forgiven for mistaken understandings of law;
a mistake of law will render a seizure constitutionally unreasonable, triggering possible
application of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit,
however, has adopted a more generous position: it forgives “objectively reasonable” police
mistakes of law. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
39. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law
officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe
that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”).
40. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority To Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381-82 (2001).
41. See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003)
(noting that state commercial law “has become close to a single, unified body of law”).
42. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (noting that “crimes ... are what the
laws of the individual States make them”).
43. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005) (surveying distinctions).
44. See Logan, supra note 15, at 76-77.
45. Id.; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n.14 (1984) (noting that “the
classification of state crimes differs widely among the States”).
46. In assessing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of such entries, the Court looks
to the gravity of the suspected misconduct, “the best indication” of which is the penalty
prescribed by a jurisdiction. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.
326, 328 (2001).
47. See, e.g., Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
police can execute a stop “when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though
not of a mere completed misdemeanor”); State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (same); Blaidsell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 881-84 (Minn. Ct. App.
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correlates to variable Fourth Amendment protections in the respective states.
Importantly, moreover, the corpus of state laws is complemented
by those enacted by myriad local governments, which enjoy significant criminal lawmaking power pursuant to their home rule
authority. Although the substance of local laws must comport with
state and federal constitutional expectations, local governments
typically are limited only to the extent that their laws are preempted by or conflict with extant state law.48
These limits, however, have little practical effect.49 Local police
power is especially pervasive relative to misconduct of a less serious,
public order nature, reflecting the felt need of localities to tailor
their laws to their unique social and political conditions.50 For
instance, one regularly sees in local codes prohibitions against such
behaviors as obstruction of public space, littering, aggressive
panhandling, automobile cruising, excessive noise, drug paraphernalia and simple drug possession, possession of weapons other than
firearms, sleeping in public places, and assault.51 Local prerogative
is also manifest in “refinements” to existing state criminal laws,52

1985) (same).
48. See generally George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise
of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REV. 417, 423-33 (1995) (providing overview
of preemption and conflict doctrines).
49. See SANDRA M. STEVENSON, 1 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05[2], at 2132 (2d ed. 2000) (“The reality is that state legislatures seldom legislate on all state or general
concerns, and a social and political vacuum would exist if a home rule entity desired to impose
controls on those matters within its own borders and was not permitted to do so.”).
50. See Horton v. City of Oakland, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
general fact that state legislation concentrates on specific areas, and leaves related areas
untouched has been held to demonstrate a legislative intent to permit local governments to
continue to apply their police power according to the particular needs of their communities
in areas not specifically preempted.”) (internal quotations omitted).
51. For a broader survey of such offenses, see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law
of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1426-28 (2001).
52. See City of Spokane v. White, 10 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“A local
ordinance does not conflict with state law merely because one prohibits a wider scope of
activity than the other does.”); C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 14.38, at
14-109 (1997 & Supp. 2000) (noting permissible sweep of “[r]efinements of detail which are
reasonably related to differing local conditions and which are consistent with the broad
parameters of the state law”).
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with local laws, for instance, containing distinct substantive requirements or a particularized geographic focus.53
Local laws thus at once significantly increase the accumulated
reach of police authority and add an expansive layer of normative
diversity, which varies from locality to locality.54 The upshot is that
police authority to search and seize individuals is geographically
diversified both vertically within states and horizontally between
states. The authority also varies over time: laws not in existence at
one time may be codified at another, and vice versa,55 and these
laws themselves undergo definitional changes over time.56 When one
further considers that judicial understandings of probable cause,
the existence of which the Court now considers synonymous with
Fourth Amendment reasonableness,57 are subject to significant
variation,58 and that police and prosecutorial enforcement norms
can differ significantly among and within states,59 the variability
assumes an even more comprehensive scale.60

53. See Logan, supra note 51, at 1430-31 (providing examples).
54. See 6 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.13, at 723 (3d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 2008) (“[T]he range of conduct prohibited by ordinances is extremely broad
and signifies the importance of municipal control of offenses against the sovereignty of the
state, conceiving the municipality to be an arm and agency of that sovereignty.”).
55. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
“Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1995) (noting same
and providing examples).
56. Logan, supra note 43, at 308 & n.270 (providing statutory examples).
57. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
58. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (observing that both reasonable
suspicion and probable cause are “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the
particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983) (calling probable cause a “fluid concept” not “readily ... reduced to a neat set
of legal rules”).
59. See, e.g., DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION
AND UNIFORMITY (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 75-79 (1965). Variability is further
enhanced by some, but not all, states enacting laws that mandate arrest in specified
circumstances, such as domestic abuse. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1522 (2007).
60. Variability, it is worth mentioning, also stems from nonstatutory state and local
policies on which Fourth Amendment protections can hinge. See, e.g., United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 117-18 (2001) (predicating probationer’s ability to resist a search
on state-imposed conditions); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1987) (requiring that
lawful auto inventory searches be conducted pursuant to local police department criteria).
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B. Sixth Amendment
Sixth Amendment doctrine is also directly tied to state and local
legal variability. The right to appointed counsel depends on whether
a jurisdiction elects to impose upon conviction “actual imprisonment”61 or probation conditions enforceable through imprisonment.62
Additionally, the right to have one’s case decided by a jury turns on
whether conviction will result in incarceration for more than six
months.63 Because states vary considerably in their recourse to
incarceration64 and the punishments they prescribe for offenses,65
there exists corollary variability in counsel and jury rights.66 And
again, local governments augment this variability both in the
interstate and intrastate context, because although as a general rule
localities cannot punish less than or in excess of concurrent state
criminal laws,67 they often do so.68
These distinct policy preferences and constitutional outcomes
significantly affect governments and the individuals they prosecute.
When governments are less punitive, either with respect to the use
of incarceration or the quantum of punishment, they avoid the need
to extend jury and appointed counsel rights, with consequent
resource savings, but negative consequences for individuals. The
disadvantages associated with lack of trial counsel have long been
known69 and uncounseled convictions can later be used both to
61. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
62. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002).
63. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
64. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing
Practices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 226-27 (Michael Tonry
& Richard S. Frase eds., 2001) (noting variations in state sentencing guidelines systems);
Kevin R. Reitz, The Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 116, 125 (1996) (surveying significant state-level variations in incarceration
rates).
65. See Logan, supra note 43, at 259 & n.13.
66. With respect to the appointed counsel right in particular, wide variations in state
criteria for indigence inject additional variability. See Adam J. Gershowitz, The Invisible
Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 572 (2005); see also Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan,
The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2045, 2050 (2006) (noting that a majority of state criminal defendants are indigent).
67. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 54, § 17.15, at 597-607 (noting same).
68. See Logan, supra note 51, at 1433-35 (providing examples).
69. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 35, 36 (1972) (noting that “[m]isdemeanants
represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges
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enhance punishment for subsequent convictions70 and justify
deportation.71 Similarly, by withholding the jury trial right governments gain a major strategic advantage, depriving defendants of the
option to threaten exercise of the right, with its associated adverse
impact on dockets and justice system resources.
Facially, the Supreme Court’s decisional law tying counsel and
jury rights to the severity of government sanction threatened
benefits from a welcome symmetry. In reality, however, the symmetry has been undercut by state and local policies that serve to
avoid federal constitutional requirements, which the Supreme Court
has refused to check. Jury trial and counsel rights can be avoided
when jurisdictions impose punishments entailing extensive nonincarcerative sanctions.72 Likewise, jurisdictions can avoid the need
for jury trials by combining several less serious offenses for trial,
even though their consecutive sentencing exposes the defendant to
a total sentence in excess of six months.73
Another way in which counsel rights are affected relates to the
Sixth Amendment doctrine limiting the ability of police to question
a suspect once the right to counsel has attached. Here, unlike the
right to counsel and jury, which involve differences in punishment,
differences in the substantive definition of crimes injects variability.
Under the Court’s precedent, the right to counsel attaches when a
“critical stage” has been reached in the adjudication process—for
example, arraignment or a preliminary hearing.74 Thereafter, police
can deliberately elicit information from a defendant only relative to
an uncharged offense,75 requiring courts to assess the substantive
definitions of the crimes charged.76 As a result, the breadth or
dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel”) (citing AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970));
see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (calling the counsel right “indispensable
to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice”).
70. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994).
71. See Logan, supra note 51, at 1445.
72. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (counsel right); Blanton v. City of
N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 539-40, 543-45 (1989) (jury trial right).
73. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1996).
74. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (2008); Fellers v. United
States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004).
75. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76, 179 (1991).
76. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001) (reiterating and defining the Court’s
“offense-specific” test).
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narrowness with which jurisdictions define closely related crimes
can determine whether an incriminating statement must be
suppressed.77
II. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The constitutional variability just discussed is the byproduct of
conscious institutional choices within the nation’s decentralized
federalist system, which reserves to subnational political subunits
considerable lawmaking authority.78 While the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause ensures that federal law, federal treaties, and
the U.S. Constitution prevail nationally, in practice subnational law
generally must yield only when it poses a conflict. The decision to
insert an affirmative command, as opposed to permitting Congress
to enjoy veto power over state laws, was the source of sharp
disagreement during the Framing Era. The negative approach,
advocated by James Madison and James Wilson, however, was
defeated at the Convention.79 As a result, state and local laws were
permitted to take immediate effect upon enactment, subject only to
possible later judicial challenge, based on conflict, not mere policy
disagreement.80 Subnational authority was subsequently reinforced

77. Sixth Amendment law was thus made to parallel Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
jurisprudence. See id. at 173 (invoking Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
Substantive law variations thus also affect whether individuals have been twice “put in
jeopardy” for the same offense.
78. As a technical matter, local government power does not derive from federalism as
such, with its primary focus on state-federal relations, and explicit grounding in the
Constitution. See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1619, 1629 (2008). Rather, it stems from the similarly decentralized nature of state-local
government relations, which the Court has treated as synonymous with state-federal
relations. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 983-84 (2007); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
“Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429,
441 (2002) (observing that in a “functional analysis of the values that federalism serves, the
significance of local governments is enormous”).
79. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 171-77 (1996); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232-60 (2000).
80. See James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 359-60 (2008).
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by the Tenth Amendment,81 and federalist understandings of the
limited reach of federal police power authority.82
This authority assumed added importance with selective incorporation. Whereas before state and local governments acted largely
outside the federal constitutional sphere,83 during the mid-twentieth
century the Supreme Court, using the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as a fulcrum, imposed on states virtually all of
the Bill of Rights provisions, including the Fourth84 and Sixth
Amendments.85 As a result, state and local substantive criminal
laws—and the normative choices they embody—came to figure
centrally in federal constitutional law. No longer did they merely coexist in detached importance from federal constitutional law.
Rather, they came to govern the nature and extent of constitutional
rights available to the nation’s denizens.
Constitutional contingency is thus an unintended byproduct of
constitutional nationalization that is subversive of the very
enterprise itself.86 Indeed, any express effort to afford national
81. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
82. See supra note 11; see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (observing that
the criminal law “has always been thought to be the province of the States”); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (“Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated
powers, has created offenses against the United States.”); Santiago Legarre, The Historical
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 747-48 (2006) (observing that
“American federalism cannot be fully understood without reference to the police power, for
… ‘police power’ was the name Americans chose in order to designate the whole range of
legislative power not delegated to the federal government and retained by the states”).
83. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (Pet.) 243, 249 (1833)
(observing that the Bill of Rights “contain[s] no expression indicating an intention to apply
[its provisions] to the state [or local] governments”). States of course were constrained by
limits imposed in the body of the Constitution itself, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Moreover, according to one commentator, antebellum state
courts in practice “understood the Bill [of Rights] to set out general constitutional principles
applicable to state legislatures and executives alike.” Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in
Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
84. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
85. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1977).
86. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819) (rejecting the claim
that states should be permitted to obstruct federal power and stating that “[t]his was not
intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent
on the States”); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 902 (2005) (observing that the “core purpose of the Supremacy Clause
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importance to state and local laws would—as at the country’s
origin87—have very likely inspired significant backlash. This Part
examines the consequences of contingent constitutionalism, which
despite its undesigned origins, has significant benefits as well as
detriments.
A. Benefits
A chief benefit of contingent constitutionalism relates to its
federalism-enforcing characteristics: it permits state and local
normative choices to be maintained, at once preserving what the
Anti-Federalists lauded as subnational “individuality”88 and voiding
the political self-abnegation typically associated with absorption
into a federal union.89 Contingent constitutionalism thus operates
in tandem with broader structural political safeguards in the
national legislative arena, posited by Herbert Wechsler and others
down the years.90 Yet here the process is far more direct and
pervasive in effect. Whereas Wechsler’s political safeguards model
was to prevent the states from interfering with the unified operation of federal law”).
87. As William McClaine asserted at the North Carolina ratifying convention, “[t]o permit
the local laws of any state to control the laws of the Union, would be to give the general
government no powers at all.” 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 181 (Jonathan Eliot ed., 2d ed. 1888). “[A] part,” as
was argued, was never to control the “whole.” Id. To Samuel Adams, the idea that there
should be a sovereignty within a sovereignty (“Imperium in Imperio”) was a “Solecism in
Politics.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1513, 1526 (1987) (quoting Letter from Samuel Adams to H.A. Cushing (Dec. 3, 1787),
in 4 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 324 (Harry A. Cushing ed., 1908)).
88. See SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
239 (1993) (quoting Dr. Johnson of Connecticut who observed that that the Anti-Federalists
saw “the states as ‘so many political societies,’ each with its ‘individuality,’ while the
[Federalists] considered the states as merely ‘districts of people composing one political
Society’”).
89. See Sanford Levinson, Looking Ahead When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some
Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 361 (2004) (observing that “[t]he possibility that local
values will in fact be trumped by national ones is the price one pays for entering into a federal
union”).
90. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For
more recent expositions in the same vein, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1993); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
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envisions state political interests being served and reflected by
virtue of congressional representation,91 with contingent constitutionalism the decisions of state and local political actors actually
drive federal outcomes—of a constitutional, not typically statutory,
nature—without mediation by federal actors. Political preferences,
rather than at best remotely influencing federal decision-making
processes, enjoy direct real-time effect in states and localities.
This directness has several broader institutional advantages.
Most fundamentally, it ensures that federal constitutional rights
remain vitally connected to state and local values. As a consequence,
“dead hand” problems are avoided,92 resulting in what might be
thought a variant of popular constitutionalism.93 The tying of state
and local law to federal rights also avoids a situation akin to what
Judge Henry Friendly called the “spurious uniformity” of law that
had prevailed until Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,94 whereby “federal
general common law” was superimposed on states.95 Federal outcomes, rather, are driven by the normative preferences of jurisdictions in which they take shape.
Consistent with federalist ideals, there thus exists a greater
chance that more citizens will be satisfied by locally specified
normative preferences.96 With substantive law and constitutional
outcomes so calibrated, citizens unhappy with the impact of the
91. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1681, 1681-82 (2008).
92. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 (1997) (asserting that
it is “antidemocratic for a contemporary majority to be governed by values enshrined in the
Constitution over two hundred years ago”); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead
Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (“The first question any advocate
of constitutionalism must answer is why Americans of today should be bound by the decisions
of people some 212 years ago.”).
93. Popular constitutionalists seek to make democratic choice, not federal judicial fiat, the
arbiter of contestable federal constitutional provisions. They thus focus on constitutional
meaning, not application, as here. For an overview of the movement, see Matthew D. Adler,
Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006).
94. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
95. A key difference, however, is that here we have a “matter [ ] governed by the Federal
Constitution,” a realm that the Erie Court emphasized remained subject to federal control.
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
96. See generally Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1669, 1686 (2007).
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policies of their state or local governments can exercise their exit
rights.97 As a consequence, yet another federalist ideal is possibly
promoted: intergovernmental competition,98 relative to criminal
justice—a domain in which perhaps the greatest subnational normative diversity exists and the federal government has long
deferred.99
Finally, by anchoring federal rights in state and local normative
preferences, contingent constitutionalism ensures that such norms
remain cabined in their place of origin, as Madison wished.100 The
norms, with their attendant federal constitutional consequences, are
federalized but not nationalized. State and local “experiments,” as
Justice Brandeis famously envisioned, can be undertaken “without
risk to the rest of the country.”101
B. Detriments
Just as permitting federal rights to hinge on state and local law
has benefits, it has troubling ramifications. Most fundamentally, the
resulting highly variable rights regime undermines the historic
effort to foster a shared sense of nationhood. Federal constitutional
rights, rather than being categorically available nationwide, vary.
97. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1344-50
(2004) (discussing “foot voting” and contrasting it with “ballot box voting”). The possibility,
although remote relative to the great majority of governmental policies, likely has special
salience with criminal procedure rights, as evidenced in the migration of southern blacks
northward in search of fairer treatment. See DANIEL M. JOHNSON & REX R. CAMPBELL, BLACK
MIGRATION IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY 84-85 (1981).
98. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991):
[Federalism] assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
99. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., PHILLIP W. ROEDER,
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN STATES 99, 116, 203 (1994)
(commenting on the consistent preferences reflected in public opinion polls for criminal justice
matters being handled by state and local governments, not the U.S.).
100. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(expressing satisfaction that a “flame” might ignite in one state yet “be unable to spread a
general conflagration through the other States”).
101. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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One’s residence, or indeed even the happenstance of one’s physical
location when alleged misconduct occurs—not federal citizenship—
determines the availability of federal rights, a situation reminiscent
of the state-centrism of antebellum times.102
Making federal rights and protections available in principle to the
nation as a whole, but in actuality having them rely on one’s
particular geographic location within the nation, raises obvious
fairness concerns.103 Although theoretically similarly situated as
Americans,104 the constitutional rights we enjoy in fact vary based
on the state or locality in which we are located. Importantly, this
democratically driven variability has been permitted to operate in
a manner largely unchecked by judicial mediation. Despite accepted
modern understandings of the judiciary’s counter-majoritarian
structural role,105 the Court has consistently defended legislative
102. See Seth Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 984 (2002):
At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his federal commission, and
renounced his oath of allegiance because as a “Virginian” he could not bear to
honor that oath. It is hard today to find a citizen of the United States who
conceives of her primary identity as a “Virginian” or a “Pennsylvanian.”
103. Similar arguments have been leveled against varied interpretations of federal
statutory law. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994) (“[N]ational uniformity of
federal law ensures that similarly situated litigants are treated equally; this is considered a
hallmark of fairness in a regime committed to a rule of law.”); Comm’n on Revision of the Fed.
Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67
F.R.D. 195, 206 (1975) (“[D]ifferences in legal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal
treatment of citizens ... solely because of differences in geography.”).
104. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(recognizing “United States citizenship [as] the dominant and paramount allegiance among
us”); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws,
92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2006) (surveying other manifestations of national citizenship). It is
perhaps more accurate to say that such individuals are factually similarly situated, inasmuch
as they committed (or omitted) the same acts, yet are charged (or not charged) in accord with
varied state and local laws.
105. The view of the Framers on majoritarianism has of course been the subject of scholarly
disagreement. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response
to a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-50 (2008),
and Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law
Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understandings of Due “Process of Law,” 77
MISS. L.J. 1, 138-40 (2007), with Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131 passim (1991). The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent
efforts at incorporation, however, largely transformed constitutional understandings. Amar,
supra, at 1136-37 (noting how post-incorporation “the Bill [of Rights was] pressed into the
service of protecting vulnerable minorities from dominant social majorities”).
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prerogative in its constitutional criminal procedure decisions. With
respect to search and seizure limits, for instance, the Court’s
decision to equate Fourth Amendment reasonableness with probable
cause that any infraction was committed106 empowered police to
freely deploy criminal codes.107 Similarly, the Court’s decision to
condition Sixth Amendment jury trial and counsel rights to the type
and degree of punishment threatened,108 rather than deferring to
the Amendment’s explicit extension to “all criminal prosecutions,”109
directly tied these rights to majoritarian will.110 Its subsequent
refusal to limit state efforts to avoid constitutional strictures, for
instance by “stacking” charged offenses,111 enabled legislatures to
avoid even the constitutional limits the Court saw fit to impose.
While the counter-majoritarian role of courts has remained controversial in some quarters,112 serving to protect political minorities
106. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (stating that “[i]f an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender”).
107. As noted earlier, however, the Court’s deference to state legislative judgment has been
selective with respect to Fourth Amendment limits on the warrantless arrest authority of
police. While urging in Atwater that nonconstitutional, for example, legislative or administrative limits be used in lieu of judicially imposed constitutional limits, the Court in Virginia
v. Moore, 125 S. Ct. 1598 (2008), refused to enforce such a state limit with the federal
exclusionary rule. See supra note 32. The end result, again, has been to facilitate the effects
of incorporation, without federal judicial mediation.
108. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that “[t]he
trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury”). For a persuasive
argument in favor of a broadened reading relative to the jury trial right in particular, consistent with the Framers’ design, see Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine,
4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (1994). As Lynch notes, the Court has not seen fit to extend its
“petty offense” determinative distinction to numerous other Sixth Amendment rights,
including speedy trial, assistance of counsel, and confrontation of witnesses. Id. at 11-12.
110. Even if the Court were to broaden the right’s availability in accord with the
Amendment’s text, however, the contingency described here would still result in rights
variation. This is because jurisdictions vary in their labeling of misconduct as “criminal,” a
categorical prerequisite to attachment of Sixth Amendment rights. See Wayne A. Logan, The
Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 128182 (1998).
111. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323-34 (1996); see also supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 17 (1990).
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and nullify views held by majorities,113 contingent constitutionalism
highlights the perils of unadulterated majoritarianism: federal
constitutional rights are permitted to turn solely on the variable
political preferences of state and local governments.114 As John Hart
Ely recognized almost three decades ago, “it makes no sense to
employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for
protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.”115
Yet this is precisely the outcome here. Rather than ameliorating
possible imperfections in the political process, contingent constitutionalism privileges and imbues them with federal constitutional
effect. While contingency itself is the perhaps unavoidable result of
the nation’s decentralized federalist system and incorporation
doctrine, the judicial imposition of uniform procedural rules, the
application of which turns on diverse underlying substantive
triggering conditions, fosters its attendant disparity. The consequences of contingent constitutionalism have, in significant part,
ultimately also been enabled and perpetuated by the federal
judiciary’s ongoing failure to mediate its influence,116 such as by
refusing to limit the warrantless arrest authority of police.117
113. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135
(1980).
114. For an interesting account of this variability, revealing the importance of
particularized state-level political dynamics, democratic processes, and governance
approaches, leading to very different crime control policies, see Vanessa Barker, The Politics
of Punishing: Building a State Governance Theory of American Imprisonment Variation, 8
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 5 (2006).
115. ELY, supra note 113, at 69. A similar insight motivated James Madison, who
recognized that liberty was threatened not so much by arbitrary acts of government, at odds
with those governed, “but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the
major number of the constituents.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson
eds., 1977).
With criminal laws in particular, it is perhaps more accurate to say that legislative, not
democratic, majoritarianism is at play. As Bill Stuntz has observed, the political appeal of
criminal laws does not always depend on support from a majority of voters, given the
significant political benefit attending criminal legislation in general. William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 528 (2001).
116. Indeed, it is fair to say that the judiciary’s concurrent effort to impose uniform
procedural standards while eschewing regulation of the underlying substantive laws on which
they rely has resulted in predictable disuniformity. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal
Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 993-96 (2001) (noting difficulties
created by federal decoupling of state civil laws from their accompanying procedures).
117. Ironically, the Court’s ongoing effort to impose readily administrable “bright-line”
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Finally, contingent constitutionalism suffers from the absence of
any complementary self-limiting legislative mechanism. Like many
other rights, criminal procedure protections can be conceived in
terms of their “positive” and “negative” quality. As Isaiah Berlin
famously noted,118 negative liberty ensures “freedom from” government action, thought by many to be the primary focus of the Bill of
Rights.119 “Positive liberty” imposes a comparatively rare responsibility on government,120 encompassing what David Sklansky has
termed “quasi-affirmative rights,” obligations triggered when the
government seeks to impinge on individuals in some way, such as
depriving them of physical liberty.121
Contingent constitutionalism is especially sensitized to negative
liberties. A foremost example lies in the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, which, as
discussed, is directly tied to the existence and definition of state and
local substantive criminal laws.122 With more such law comes less
freedom from search and seizure. The same can be said of the
negative right embodied in the Sixth Amendment’s freedom from
police questioning after the right to counsel attaches. The greater
the gamut of substantive law available to government, the lower the
likelihood that police will be prevented from questioning criminal
suspects and later use the information obtained in prosecutions.123

rules to guide police—exemplified by Atwater and other cases—has had the broader
unintended effect of making application of the Fourth Amendment significantly more variable.
118. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191,
203-06 (1997); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 868 (1986).
119. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (asserting that
the nation’s constitutional framework embodies a “charter of negative rather than positive
liberties”); Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864-74 (2001).
For contrary views, as a matter of characterization or normative preference, see, for example,
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2309 (1990), and
Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 382-85 (1993).
120. See Currie, supra note 118, at 864.
121. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1230, 1238-39 (2002).
122. This is not to say that Fourth Amendment protections are wholly negative in
character. For instance, the right to a “prompt” judicial assessment of the grounds for a
warrantless arrest and the warrant expectation itself—especially at play in home entries—are
“quasi-affirmative” in nature. See id. at 1241-43.
123. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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With positive liberties, such as the Sixth Amendment rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial, the relation between state and
local law and federal constitutional rights is more nuanced. As discussed, Supreme Court case law calibrates the availability of both
rights to the punishment preferences of state and local governments.124 The greater the liberty deprivation faced by defendants,
the greater the onus to extend protections. If a government wishes
to incarcerate an individual, as opposed to requiring a fine or
community service, then the government must shoulder the costs of
paying for appointed counsel if the individual is indigent.125
Similarly, if a government wishes to punish a crime by a prison
term in excess of six months, the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
is triggered.126 There is thus a quid pro quo, requiring that government ante up in accord with the extent of individual liberty
threatened.127
From a political process perspective, the nature of the right in
question thus logically bears significance. With negative rights,
given the acknowledged modest political influence of criminal
defendants and the well known political appeal of appearing tough
on crime,128 legislatures can often lack incentive to constrain their
zeal to enact criminal laws.129 Positive rights, with their attendant
affirmative governmental obligations, however, have significant
resource consequences, and thus can be expected to have special
resonance for legislators and taxpayers alike. Yet even here the
constraint is possibly less than appears because governments have
124. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
125. See Moore v. Jarvis, 885 F.2d 1565, 1572 (11th Cir. 1989).
126. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.6 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 160 (1968).
127. On the tendency of the Court to tie constitutional rights to punishment interests of
the State, and the difficulties the approach presents more generally, see Eugene Volokh,
Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1959-61 (2004).
128. See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 85-109 (2009).
129. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365-66 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
that “[l]egislators by virtue of their political role are more often subjected to the political
pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment values than are judicial officers”).
Countervailing pressure is especially likely to be absent in instances of laws mainly enforced
against out-of-state visitors. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing in an Intolerant Society, 35 CRIM.
L. BULL. 334, 365 n.132 (1999) (noting an observation of Justice Stevens to this effect in oral
argument in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)).
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been afforded latitude to avoid their affirmative obligations—such
as by stacking several less serious charges, permitting the jury trial
requirement to be avoided.130
Of course, whether the grant of legislative preeminence yields
aggregate social benefit depends on the nature of the legislative
enterprise itself. Based on experience to date, however, the structural absence of a self-limiting legislative incentive, combined with
a lack of judicial willingness to regulate the substantive criminal
law, presents valid cause for concern, especially relative to negative
rights. For better or worse, the lack of limiting influence has
resulted in creation of a de facto regime of positivist constitutionalism, based on the normative preferences of individual states
and localities.
III. NEW UNDERSTANDINGS
Contingent constitutionalism thus has an array of consequences,
which, although not resulting from overt design, are nonetheless
quite significant. This Part considers how acknowledgment and
awareness of these consequences casts in new light the traditional
understandings of the American constitutional order.
A. The Myth of Rights Nationalism
Perhaps most notably, the discussion here lays to rest the
enduring myth of rights nationalism. Even though federal constitutional rights are understood to extend equally across the land, in
reality they can and do vary considerably in their availability, not
only from state to state, but also within states themselves, the latter
as a result of the law-making authority of local governments.
Understanding of the phrase “We the People of the United States”131
is thus complicated anew. While in antebellum times the phrase
was conceived as a plural noun, the Civil War inspired a linguistic
transformation. The “United States” came to be conceived as an “is”

130. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323-34 (1996); see also supra text
accompanying note 73.
131. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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not an “are.”132 No longer was the union seen as merely an assemblage of independent sovereigns, nor were its people to be foremost
identified with their states. Rather, as the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment made clear, the political identity of Americans was to
be dual in character,133 and over time American self-identity has
assumed an increasingly nationalist cast.134
Ongoing efforts at nationalization have been attenuated, however,
both as a result of federalism, itself a historically contested
notion,135 and, ironically, the nationalistic Fourteenth Amendment,
as a result of incorporation.136 There is no mistaking that the union
heterogeneously remains, as Madison long ago posited, based upon
assent “given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire
nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to
which they respectively belong.”137
Legal myths, as Alexis de Tocqueville long ago recognized, have
always figured centrally in American governance,138 and are not
easily dispelled. Like other myths, rights nationalism has survived
not so much because of its veracity, but rather because of its
132. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 859 (1988)
(“Before 1861 the two words ‘United States’ were generally rendered as a plural noun: ‘the
United States are a republic.’ The war marked a transition of the United States to a singular
noun.”). For a revisionist take of this account, focusing on the use of the plural noun itself in
post-Civil War Supreme Court opinions, see Minor Myers, Supreme Court Usage & The
Making of an “Is,” 11 GREEN BAG 2D 457 (2008).
133. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
... are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside.”).
134. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 349-51 (2003) (surveying manifestations of this tendency).
135. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 17-52 (2007) (noting ongoing disputes over the meaning and
effect of federalism); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1502
(1994) (remarking that “[t]here are, after all, two sides to federalism: not just preserving state
authority where appropriate, but also enabling the federal government to act where national
action is desirable”).
136. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
138. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835) (observing that “[t]he government
of the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions”). For the classic exposition on legal myths
more generally, see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). For more recent discussions see,
for example, Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123 (1989); Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61
STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2007).
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functional benefit.139 As historian Karen Armstrong has noted, a
myth “is true because it is effective, not because it gives us factual
information.”140 Americans, it would seem, are content to labor
under the conceit that they are bound by a uniformly available body
of federal constitutional rights,141 akin to Robert Cover’s “nomos,”142
expressive of collective national identity. This despite the empiric
reality that access to such rights very much depends on the
particular state and local polities in which they find themselves.
In the final analysis, it might be that explicit recognition of rights
variability actually fosters, not lessens, Americans’ allegiance to
their national union. Indeed, federal deference to state and local
norms in particular, a hallmark of contingent constitutionalism,
might well have such an effect, especially among proponents of
decentralized federalism. This is because subnational political preferences are given direct and individualized force, rather than being
subsumed (and perhaps ignored), such as occurs in the effort to
“count” such preferences in the name of achieving a national consensus vis-à-vis given constitutional rights.143 Even if not, however,
a more informed understanding of the nation’s actual constitutional
idiom would constitute a major improvement over the unrealistic
unidimensional understanding that has reigned to date.

139. See SHIRLEY PARK LOWRY, FAMILIAR MYSTERIES: THE TRUTH IN MYTH 3 (1982)
(describing a myth as “a story whose vivid symbols render concrete a special perception about
people and their world”).
140. KAREN ARMSTRONG, A SHORT HISTORY OF MYTH 10 (2005).
141. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 130 (2001) (noting that
“our sense of national identity as a people literally constituted by the Constitution is linked
indissolubly with ideals of common constitutional rights.... [N]ational ideals require national
enforcement as an affirmation of our shared nationhood”); KEITH E. WITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 11 (1999)
(“The Constitution helps create a national identity.”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2027 (2003) (“From the very founding of the
republic, the Constitution has been viewed by Americans as the preeminent and allencompassing symbol of American nationhood.”).
142. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1983).
143. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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B. The Nexus Between Substantive Laws and Rights
Recognition of contingent constitutionalism also adds to our
understanding of the interactive relationship between substantive
criminal laws and constitutional rights, and the nature of such
rights.
The connection has been drawn most effectively by Professor Bill
Stuntz, who in a series of articles observed that judicially imposed
constitutional limits have actually encouraged the proliferation of
substantive criminal laws,144 which courts have left largely unregulated.145 The discussion here confirms this interaction but augments
it in an important way, noting the influence of the state and local
criminal laws themselves on the effectuation of federal constitutional norms.146 Revealing this latter influence has two chief consequences.
First, doing so has the potential to facilitate a much needed selfreflection in the criminal lawmaking process.147 Because contingent
constitutionalism operates without explicit authorization, unlike the
federal Assimilative Crimes Act and similar provisions,148 the causal
effect of state and local laws—and the availability of federal constitutional rights—can be left undeliberated and uncontemplated.149
144. See William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 782 (2006); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]. On
the sometimes elusive distinction between criminal law substance and procedure, see GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 7-24 (1998).
145. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11-12 (1996).
146. Cf. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 144, at 6-12 (noting how state funding and
resource decisions can also affect the availability of federal constitutional rights such as the
right to adequate counsel).
147. See Joshua Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme
Court: How a Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1507, 1531 (1999) (“Penal codes too often are little more than a conglomeration of
statutes enacted by legislators seeking political advantage, who have no real interest in
determining whether the finished product is just or rational.”). On the point more generally,
see, for example, Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644 (2005).
148. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103,
111 (2008).
149. As a general rule, such is not the case with federal statutory law. See Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (noting that “we must generally assume, in the absence of
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State and local constituencies might well approve of particular
substantive laws if fully informed of their constitutional ramifications; but then again, they might not.150 After all, they, not the
federal government, must bear the very significant costs of policing,
adjudication, and imprisonment, as well as impact on their rights
and liberties.
Consciousness of the nexus between substantive criminal laws
and the application of federal constitutional rights thus holds the
promise, however remote, of enhanced legislative decision making
and policy outcomes.151 Moreover, to the extent that desuetude is
regarded a problem,152 jurisdictions will be incentivized to reexamine their criminal codes, ameliorating the long recognized predilection for stasis.153 With this awareness, in short, the criminal
lawmaking political process can at last perhaps be imbued with a
conscious deliberative quality that courts have long unjustly attributed to it.154
plain indication to the contrary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the
application of the federal act dependent on state law. That assumption is based on the fact
that the application of federal legislation is nationwide”).
150. Cf. Charles B. Kornmann, Injustices: Applying the Sentencing Guidelines and Other
Federal Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENT. R. 71, 71 (2000) (observing that “Congress
enacts statutes, very likely with little, if any, thoughts as to how severely they impact Native
Americans”).
151. Such a prospect was identified by Justice Brennan in the context of the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel. Having the right attach whenever prison is
authorized, not only when imposed—as the majority in Scott v. Illinois held—would ideally
encourage reconsideration of criminal codes, a prospect he believed “long overdue.” Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 388 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A state legislature or local
government might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for certain
minor offenses in light of the expense of meeting the requirements of the Constitution.”); see
also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1125 (2006) (urging states to decriminalize nonserious
misdemeanors to lessen caseloads).
Suffice it to say, however, such consciousness can have less beneficial results, such as when,
rather than decriminalizing certain minor offenses, a jurisdiction instead favors legislation
consciously designed to avoid triggering jury trial demands. See, e.g., Yolanda Woodlee, D.C.
Crime Package Swipes at Gunrunners, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1994, at D1.
152. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1341-42 (2008).
153. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 62-63
(1961).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (presuming that
criminal laws are predicated on conscious political choices that “[b]alanc[e] relative
hardships”); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (presuming that criminal laws
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Second, recognition of the constitutional influence of state and
local laws has more basic epistemic significance. Laid bare as a constitutional modality, it highlights the value choices the nation’s
federalist system has embraced over the years. These choices are
perhaps best conceived in comparison to the role subnational
preferences have played in the creation of national constitutional
norms noted at the outset,155 what Timothy Zick has called “constitutional empiricism.”156 With its empirical approach, the Court has
employed a variety of methods to quantify state preferences as an
ostensibly objective means of constitutional interpretation. This
purported objectivity is misleading, however, for in actuality the
methods used reflect an array of underlying normative biases157
and fail to accurately gauge broader democratic preferences.158
Moreover, quantification itself can readily reduce to an empty
formalism devoid of constitutional norms and values. “[I]t is a
calculation,” as Zick observes, “rather than a constitution, that is
being expounded.”159
Contingent constitutionalism, by contrast, lacks such defects. To
be sure, it similarly derives from a process of social and political
construction, but its outcomes stem in unmediated form from value
choices reflected in incorporation doctrine, decentralized federalism,
and prior precedent of the Court—not variable post hoc judicial
construction. An unreconstructed constitutionalism is thus at work,
directly reflective of state and local normative preferences, permitting a more robust operational understanding of American constitutionalism.

are enacted with an awareness and appreciation of any “possible injustice[s]” associated).
155. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
156. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 115 (2003).
157. Id. at 185-94; see also id. at 192-93 (noting that empiricism “does not take place in a
staid, sterile laboratory; it is part of a highly charged adversarial process, one which results
in the definition of constitutional rights, powers, and values”).
158. Among other shortcomings, use of state “head counts” fails to reflect actual aggregate
population-based preferences, unqualifiedly attaching equal weight to large and small
population states. See Jacobi, supra note 19, passim; Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our
Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1685 (2007).
159. Zick, supra note 156, at 220.
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C. Legal Spatiality
Recognition of contingent constitutionalism also sheds new light
on traditional understandings of legal spatiality. Historically, of
course, laws have been imbued with a deep sense of territoriality.
Entry into a jurisdiction, and exit from it, typically determines both
applicable legal expectations and the rights available to individuals.
True to dominant Westphalian notions of sovereignty, as Kal
Raustiala has noted, “where you are determines what rules you are
governed by.”160
Certainly within the territorial bounds of the U.S. in modern
times, no controversy has existed over whether federal constitutional rights “follow the flag.” The discussion here, however, renders
uncertain what is meant by “flag.” Although being present in the
U.S. requires recognition of the bundle of rights tied to the national
flag, it matters what state or local flag, so to speak, flies. National
rights extend in principle, based on one’s presence on U.S. soil, but
the actual availability of such rights depends on the normative
content of state and local substantive criminal laws. Federal constitutional rights, though not spatially delimited in a formal sense, are
spatially conditioned on state and local criminal laws, in a functional sense. Despite the absence of textual support,161 and the
Framers’ predisposition to have liberty relate primarily to persons
rather than places,162 location thus has critical significance.
Ultimately, this spatiality risks creation of what Gerald Neuman
has referred to as “anomalous zones,” enclaves where constitutional
norms are excepted from.163 To Neuman, creating such carve-outs is
“a dangerous enterprise. Anomalous zones may become, quite
literally, sites of contestation of the polity’s fundamental values.
When an anomalous zone is defined so that mere presence in the
160. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW, at v (2009).
161. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1, 19 (2002) (observing that “the Constitution’s provisions are not textually restricted by
either the population or the geographic area to which they apply”).
162. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, X, XIV; see also, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”).
163. Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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zone results in suspension of the rule, its subversive potential is
magnified.”164 Although not as troubling as the rights exceptionalism experienced by Haitian and Cuban refugees detained at
Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba, considered by Neuman
in his 1996 article, or, surely, the more recent overt geographic
manipulation of rights of alleged terrorists housed at the Base,165
the domestic constitutionalism examined here operates by a similar
organizing principle. Its pervasive nature, in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and localities, itself underscores the persistent
strict territorialism of American constitutional law.166 This territorialism persists despite the increasingly “flat” and borderless
nature of the world at-large,167 and the judiciary’s own willingness
to afford rights to U.S. citizens beyond the nation’s physical
borders.168 The discussion here thus adds to the broader literature
on the influence of geography on rights,169 highlighting in particular
how U.S. constitutional rights are refracted through the lens of state
and local government normative preferences.

164. Id. at 1233-34.
165. On the issue of Guantanamo’s asserted rightlessness more generally, see Johann
Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004).
166. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504
(2005) (noting with respect to international applications that “federal courts continue to cling
to the notion that American law is tethered to territory—that simply by moving an individual
around in space, the rights that individuals enjoy wax and wane”).
167. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 7 (2005); Raustiala, supra note 166, at 2548 (“The evolution of American law
has been a process in which formalistic categories based on spatial location and geographic
borders were rejected in favor of more supple, contextual concepts such as ‘effects’ and
‘minimum contacts.’”).
168. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957) (holding that Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections extend to U.S. citizens abroad); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E.
Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that Fourth Amendment reasonableness
expectations extend to U.S. citizens abroad); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240
(2008) (holding that foreign detainees held at Guantanamo cannot be deprived of the
“constitutional privilege of habeas corpus,” except in “conformance with the Suspension
Clause”).
169. In addition to Professor Raustiala’s work, see, for example, David R. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1368 (1996);
Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 835 (2007); Timothy
Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 584 (2006).
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D. Incorporation’s Legacy
Finally, recognition of contingent constitutionalism obliges reconsideration of the long-running debate over incorporation doctrine.
For decades, judicial titans battled over the validity of using the
Fourteenth Amendment to impose on states the criminal procedure
protections of the Bill of Rights.170 Even after the Court settled on
an approach of selective incorporation, principled dissent remained
over the imposition of federal constitutional norms on state and
local criminal justice systems.171
Others expressed alarm over the likely diminution of federal
rights themselves. The second Justice Harlan, for instance, warned
of the “major danger” incorporation posed to federal standards,172
averring in Duncan v. Louisiana that “provisions of the Bill of
Rights may be watered down in the needless pursuit of uniformity.”173 Two years later, in Williams v. Florida,174 Harlan condemned the Court’s decision to eschew the federal requirement of
unanimous twelve-member juries in the interest of deferring to
common state approaches.175 Adoption of a six-member jury system,
he complained, “dilutes a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the
logic of ‘incorporation’ ... with the reality of federalism.”176 Later
decisions by the Court supported Harlan’s recognition, such as vis-àvis constitutional expectations regarding persons qualified to issue
arrest warrants177 and preside over the trial of misdemeanants.178
The discussion here confirms the interrelation of incorporation
and federalism, but exposes another way that subnational governments affect the nation’s constitutional order. Not only do they help
determine the substantive content of national constitutional norms,
170. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Foreword, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO.
L.J. 253 (1982).
171. Id. at 314-25.
172. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 n.21 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
175. Id. at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
176. Id.
177. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 345-46 (1972) (deferring to local
practices in allowing such warrants to be issued by nonlawyer clerks).
178. See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976) (deferring to state practices in
approving use of lay magistrates in a two-tier system for misdemeanor trials).

178

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:143

based on judicial consideration of their particular preferences and
characteristics, but they also determine whether the putative
federal floor of rights is applicable at all.179 The highly variable end
result, stemming from the diversity of state and local criminal law
norms,180 is reminiscent of a state of affairs widely condemned in
pre-incorporation times—a national landscape marked by a
“checkerboard of human rights.”181
Stepping back, over four decades after the process of selective
incorporation caused such great alarm, the Warren Court’s
“criminal procedure revolution” seems not so revolutionary after all.
We now know that many of the Court’s landmark decisions of the
1960s were in fact often majoritarian in nature, reflecting the
preferences of subnational polities182 and at times their desires for
greater national rights uniformity.183 Even more important, the
“constitutional strait jacket”184 purportedly imposed on them has
been loosened by the federal judiciary, which has not only limited
179. History has thus provided an irony worth noting. Justice Harlan’s preference for caseby-case determinations of the constitutionality of state practices, while failing to persuade the
Court, has in a sense won out: federal rights today are in fact available on an ad hoc basis.
For more on Harlan’s approach, see Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure:
Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125 (2005).
180. Diversity is especially marked with respect to the less serious crimes that dominate
nonfederal criminal justice systems. Although state criminal codes are largely duplicative
relative to serious common law crimes such as murder and robbery, they show significant
variation with less serious crimes, and localities add to this diversity with their laws targeting
malum prohibitum and other less serious misconduct.
181. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 39-40 (1970) (noting that “[i]n a nation
where state lines had otherwise become so unimportant, this checkerboard of human rights
had to be short lived”); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 274 (1973) (expressing concern that
increased mobility “made America too much one country” to justify deference to state and local
diversity).
182. See Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 400-02 (2005); Corrina Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364-65 (2004).
183. Such was the case, for instance, with the Sixth Amendment-based right of indigent
accused felons to appointed counsel. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES,
RULINGS, AND LEGACY 171 (2001) (noting that when the Court decided Gideon v. Wainright
in 1963, forty-five states afforded indigents a right to appointed counsel).
184. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (condemning
incorporation because “States, with their differing law enforcement problems, should not be
put in a constitutional strait jacket”); Israel, supra note 170, at 315 (citing other opinions to
this effect).
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the reach and content of criminal procedure rights,185 but also made
their availability contingent upon subnational legal norms.186
As a result, today we have a national constitutional rights regime
that while having the patina of uniformity is, in actuality, functionally akin to the nonuniform regime incorporation doctrine sought to
replace.187 As in the pre-incorporation era,188 subnational political
units can, if they wish,189 operate outside the federal constitutional
rubric. They do so not on the basis of outright defiance of federal

185. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147-48 (1997)
(observing that such rights have been “hollowed out from within”).
186. See also David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution: Rights of the Accused in a
Conservative Age, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 126, 142 (David J. Bodenhamer
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 2008) (noting prevailing deference to legislative majorities and
respect for state and local authority under the guise of federalism).
187. See Israel, supra note 170, at 337-38.
For the pre-1960's Court, which gave more weight to interests of federalism, the
fundamental fairness doctrine was obviously preferred because it readily
allowed greater leeway to the state systems. For the Court of the 1960's, which
gave greater weight to expanding the protection of the accused, the selective
incorporation doctrine was preferred; it made immediately available a large body
of federal precedent that extended the rights of the accused substantially beyond
the fundamental fairness decisions of the past.
Id.
188. See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framer’s Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 146 (2001) (observing
that “[f]or almost all of our history, the federal government and each of the States operated
independently in defining, investigating, and prosecuting crime. The Bill of Rights’ limitations
on government did not apply to the States, which were free to protect—or not
protect—individual liberties as they saw fit”).
189. Such a desire, as discussed, would likely vary in accord with the nature of the right
potentially implicated. With negative rights, such as the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, a legislative decision to criminalize behavior
expands police power authority, which typically enjoys great political popularity. See supra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text. With positive or quasi-affirmative rights, such as the
Sixth Amendment counsel and jury trial rights, motivation might lie in the significant cost
and resource savings associated with not having to extend rights. See Richard A. Posner, The
Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and for the United States, 32
TULSA L.J. 1, 7 (1996) (asserting that incorporation “made the criminal justice system
cumbersome ... [and] expensive”); supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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dictate,190 but rather by virtue of mere application of their substantive criminal laws.191
The resulting variability has, to date, curiously failed to raise
federal judicial concern. Indeed, as discussed, the Supreme Court
has played a key role in facilitating the influence of state and local
criminal laws on the nation’s constitutional order. While postincorporation concern over constitutional disuniformity prompted
elimination of the “silver platter” doctrine,192 resulting in the application of U.S. constitutional norms in state and federal criminal
proceedings alike, regardless of whether state, local, or federal
police are involved,193 the more subtle yet far more pervasive occurrence of contingent constitutionalism continues apace.
In the final analysis, recognition of contingent constitutionalism
provides added evidence of the importance of state constitutional
law. While to date the promise of the “new federalism”194 has gone
largely unfulfilled,195 the revealed contingent quality of the federal
rights floor should provide new reason to reverse the trend. In a
190. As Marc Miller and Ron Wright have noted, the federal constitutional “floor” is not
always strictly followed by state courts in their interpretations of federally prescribed rights.
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional
Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 230-31 (2008). For discussion of the comparatively rare instance
of state courts’ outright flouting of federal constitutional doctrine more generally, see Frederic
M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008).
191. Federal constitutional law is thus in effect doubly selective in its incorporation, as a
result of both the federal courts determining which constitutional provisions warrant
incorporation, and the availability of the rights themselves turning on underlying state and
local substantive law.
192. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221
(1960).
193. See James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We
Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223, 233 (1996). As Professor Diehm notes,
however, similar incongruities have resisted judicial remedy since then on the basis of more
liberty-protective standards in states based upon their own constitutional norms. See id. at
261.
194. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
195. To date, for instance, only six states have interpreted their own constitutions to forbid
police arrests for minor offenses, as permitted by the Supreme Court’s Atwater decision. See
Wayne A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s Dissent in Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009). On the tendency of state courts to
eschew independent and rights-enhancing interpretations of their own state constitutions
more generally, see Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional
Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1499, 1502 (2005).

2009]

CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONALISM

181

true case of back to the future, rights could once again principally
emanate from, and be prescribed by, their states of origin, as was
the case before incorporation.196
CONCLUSION
Just as we now know that federal statutory197 and constitutional198 law varies throughout the nation, as a result of distinct
judicial interpretations, the discussion here underscores how federal
constitutional rights vary in their application, as a result of the
diverse body of state and local substantive criminal laws upon which
they rely. Although federal constitutional rights in theory extend
nationwide, in actuality their application is contingent upon state
and local criminal laws, reflecting the nation’s time-honored localist
orientation vis-à-vis police power matters.199
In practical effect, the federal rights pantheon is thus continually
constructed anew. This reconstruction, unlike the informal amendment process identified by commentators,200 does not entail substantive modification of federal rights. Rather, it concerns the
distribution of such rights, by virtue of the substantive criminal
laws enacted and enforced by subnational polities, an unexamined
yet critically important aspect of the nation’s constitutional order.
Even though the focus here has been on criminal procedure rights,

196. See Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the
State Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (1998). Greater rights
protection, of course, can also emanate from state or local legislative intervention, such as
with enhanced availability of counsel or jury trial rights, or procedural limits on the
warrantless arrest authority of police (backed by a statutory exclusionary rule remedy). The
prospects for such expansions, however, are limited by the same political process concerns
indentified in the text.
197. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1575 (2008)
(noting widespread variation in interpretation of federal statutory laws).
198. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1483
(2005) (recognizing that “even narrowly focused federal rights often have nonuniform
application, simply by virtue of various federal district courts, and federal appellate courts ...
coming to different conclusions on the same issue”).
199. See supra notes 11, 82 and accompanying text (noting historic expectation that state
and local governments should have primary responsibility over police power matters).
200. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925 passim (2007) (surveying
literature on influence of nonjudicial actors in forging new constitutional meanings).
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this should not obscure the reality that other federal rights, such
as those designed to protect property interests,201 also hinge upon
variable state and local legal norms. This Article, it is hoped, will
inspire additional work on a phenomenon with rich theoretical
implications and major practical significance for Americans.
Whether contingent constitutionalism is good or bad on balance
remains open to debate. What is clear, however, is that despite the
mythical sway of rights nationalism, the actual lived constitutional
experience of Americans is marked by a highly contingent, crazy
quilt of available rights, which will likely endure for years to come.

201. See supra note 14 (providing examples of contingency outside realm of criminal
procedure).

